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Michael D. Kennedy 
In the discourse of modernity, intellectuals are distinguished by 
their possession of a certain kind of intellectuality, a superior form of 
Knowledgeability. Intellectuals are defined by their attributes of 
knowledge: their higher education, their creative genius, their public 
wisdom, their access, based on superior knowledge, to the essence of a 
system. They are distinguished from non-intellectuals by their greater 
awareness of, and greater importance in, modernity. T h i s  awareness m a r  
give them a social ly unattached, relatively classless s t a t u s  in soc ietr, 
a s  Mannheim (1936:153-64) discussed, but they are not without purpose. 
Exemplifying the modern perspective, Mannheim argues that intellectual it^ 
defines the intelligentsia's social mission. 
Given this iloating quality, it is not surprising that modern 
accounts of inteilectuais' relationships t o  non-inteliectuais have been 
various. In accounts which emphasize a system's cohesion, the super'ior 
knowiedge of inteliectuals serves particular functions, a s  the altruism 
of professionals enhances the general quality of life society enjoys, 
according to Parsons (19392 and his more direct intellectual descendents. 
Or the expansion of the intellectual class may indicate the movement of 
the modern world t o  a post-industr ial condi t ion, where informat ion 
becames the valued commodity, the central capital, a s  Be]? (19732 
suggests. A1 ternat ivelr, knowledge m a r  be more directly 1 inked to power, 
where intellectuals use their intellectuality a s  a resource to establish 
certain privileges for themselves? and dominate others, a s  a whoie series 
of new class theorists from Jan Waclaw Machajski in the beginning of the 
century (see Shatz, 1905'; Kennedy, l990ai through Gouldner (19792, 
Szelenri !1382> and Derber et al. (19902 have argued. 
Within the category of inte.llectua1, there are various kinds of 
distinctions that have been considered important in modernity. Different 
groups of intellectuals contest one another for influence, based on 
different claims to competence organized around disciplines (Bourdieu, 
1988) or professions (Abbott, 1988). One might also distinguish among 
intellectuals on the basis of their relationship to other social forces, 
a s  Marxists have done, Gramsci with the most original contribution. 
Organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals represent 
emancipatorr and conservative interests, respectively (Gramsci, 19712. 
Intellectuals also may diverge based on their relationship to social 
forces based on other than class? and rather based on national identities 
and cultural traditions (.Shils3 19902. 
But all of these perspectives on the intellectual identity operate 
within modernity. .The post-modern world view suggests a different angle 
on intellectuals. Rather than consider intellectuals a s  owning a 
superior form of knowledgeability we might call "intellectuality", the 
post-modern view emphasizes the particularity and limitations of the 
intellectual claim. In this, the post-modern approximates the new class 
,theory of intellectuals, particularly in their common emphasis on the 
link between knowledge and power. But the post-modern diverges from this . 
modern account by refusing to recognize either the integrity of the 
intellectual category, which class analrsts must accept a s  essential ly 
constituted in order to proceed with their interpretation. Post- 
modernists also tend to reject the alternative prospect of classlessness, 
a normative foundation on which class analysis typcially rests. But why 
should I consider here the post-modern view of modernity rather than any 
of these other conflicts among and about intellectuals? 
I might justify my post-modern interest with reference to their 
special claim: that the post-modern is more interested in and better able 
to account for the process of identity formation than are other 
perspectives. But this assumes that identity formation is the paramount 
concern of those who'wish t o  develop the theory of intellectuals or to do 
critical social theory. Some would argue s o  (e.g. Lemert, 1991>, but ! do 
not take it a s  a given. M y  prejudice l ies in elaborating the eff icacr of 
the critical intellectual. And while understanding the constitution oi 
subject might be important in the emancipatory project, s o  too is 
envisioning how power relations can be restructured to maximize self- 
regulation in social life. 
In the* twentieth century, (if w e  can assume that the century has 
ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union since it began with the 
October Revolution), the definition of the critical intellectual w a s  
simple, T h e  critical intellectual w a s  a socialist of some sort, for 
social ism w a s  the dominant countercul ture of capital ism (Bauman, 197L). 
That intellectual might also have been feminist, especiallr after the 
1 9 7 0 ' ~ ~  been anti-racist, especially after the 1960's, and anti- 
imperialist for the entire century. But socialism w a s  definitely the 
glue wedding a range of critical inquiries. 
The twenty-first century! however, is a century of post-communism. 
T h i s  is not the end to socialism, of course, for its social democratic 
variants continue to try and manage the welfare state in some advanced 
capitalist societies. Some of sociatism's revolutionary variants remain 
appea7ing in the third world. But with the collapse of communism, the 
revol u t i onary a1 ternat i ve t o  cap i tal ism appears to have disappeared in 
the advanced countries. And it appears that w e  are left with only one 
rather more slippery counterculture, that of post-modernity. But is that 
our alternative? T h e  struggle against communism in Soviet-type societies 
w a s  not informed by the post-modern vision, even if it shared important 
attributes with it, notably in its theory of the intellectual. 
Post-communism began a s  a rejection of the capitalisti'socialist 
dichotomy. In fact, post-communism began long before communist regimes 
fell. It began with the abolition of revisionist strategies for remaking 
communist-led regimes. That abolition w a s  followed by an embrace of 
civil society a s  the emancipatorr actor and goal of intellectual praxis. 
Post-modernity, although of course primarily influenced by changes in the 
metropole, w a s  itself profoundly influenced by the onset of post- 
communism. T o  read any post-modern treatise on the social, from Foucault 
to Laclau and Mouffe and especially to Lefort (e.g. 1991), one will find 
an occasiona! aside referencing the repression in Soviet-type societies, 
and the lie of Leninism. But while post-communist and post-modern share 
much in their emphasis on contingency and subject formation, and their 
embrace of democracy a s  normative foundation, and their skepticism of the 
intellectuals-' claim to representation, there are important differences 
whose counterposition might prove useful for developing a critical 
intellectual praxis for restructuring power in the 21st century; 
In particular, can there can be a post-modern praxis for 
intellectuals in authority? Post-modern social theory suggests to me 
that there cannot be, but this might be a consequence of the 
intellectuals' disempowerment and marginality in advanced capitalism. In 
post-communist society, however, intellectuals remain far more powerful, 
and might, therefore, provide a social foundation for the development of 
such a post-modern intellectual politics of authority. Or is this an 
entirely misconceived potential, for does not post-modernity reject the 
project of intellectual authority altogether for the intellectuals' 
arrogance in claiming t o  stand above the popular? I wish this paper to be 
one which allows u s  to explore the question of post-modern intellectuals 
in power. But to see this potential, one must begin with a consideration 
of the intellectuality of post-communist civil society. 
T H E  INTELLECTUALITY OF POST-COMMUNIST CIVIL SOCIETY 
Most of m y  previous work has been about the intellectual in the 
transformations of Soviet-type societies, especially of Poland. I cannot 
g o  into great detail in this paper on that matter, especially a s  m y  
principal focus is the implications of the post-modern perspective fur 
critical intellectual praxis, But several themes on post-communist 
intellectuality deserve mention here. 
T h e  intellectual in Soviet-type societies has origins in both 
historical/cultural tradition and in the determination of the Soviet-type 
system. Because Eastern Europe did not develop a strong bourgeoisie and 
its politics w a s  dominated by the efforts of nations to win independent 
states; national intelligentsias acquired a particular prominence in the 
modern era a s  the organic representative of a "nation" (Kennedy, l??la>. 
T h i s  "intelligentsia" w a s  not distinguished by its intellectuality, a s  
much a s  by its lifestyle, values, and charismatic feelings (Gella, 1971; 
Bauman , 1987a? . 
In most but not all places, however, the Soviet-type system w a s  at 
odds w i t h  the nat ional/cul tural identity embodied by this old 
intelligentsia. T h e  intelllgesia formed by the Sovi.et-type srstem w a s  
directed at undermining the old intelligentsia identity. Intellectuals 
in that East European world of Soviet-type societies were faced with a 
double 1 ife, then: a s  a national (seeming1 y genuine and autonomous? 
intel lectual , and a s  a highly edu.cated but pol it ical ly obedient employee 
(an "unnatural" condition for an intellectual) of the Soviet-type state. 
The m i x  w a s  not conducive to system stability, but it did maintain the 
intellectual's prominence. 
T h e  intellectual continued to be important because m a s s  higher 
education, employment a s  a highly educated worker, or the fact of 
tremendous upward social mobility, w a s  one w a y  of buying off and diluting 
opposition based on national cultural traditions. On a less instrumental 
level, communism too provided scme motivation for intellectuals; Stelenri 
(1982) argued correctly that the intelligentsia and the Party shared a 
common interest in elevating the role of teleological knowledge in 
d e c i d i n g  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  su rp lus .  Indeed, the emphasis on t he  
" r a t i o n a l  p l ann ing "  o f  economy and s o c i e t y  c e r t a i n l y  r e q u i r e d  the  
e l e v a t i o n  o f  the i n t e l l e c t u a l  r o l e .  The system thus  genera ted  a  l a r g e  
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  aware o f  i t s  impor tant  r o l e  i n  mode rn i t y ,  b u t  a t  the same 
t ime aware t h a t  they were b e i n g  "oppressedn by a  s rs tem t h a t  den ied  them 
cu?  t u r a l  freedom and i n t e l  l e c t u a l  autonomy. The freedom and p rosper  i t y  
o f  c a p i t a l i s m ,  e s p e i c a l l y  f o r  those o f  t h e i r  c l a s s ,  loomed l a r g e  i n  the 
western hor  i zon. 
The i n t e l l e c t u a l s  c o u l d  no t  t r an fo rm  communism by themselves, 
however. A f t e r  a l l ,  t h i s  system was o s t e n s i b l y  des igned w i t h  the  wor2 ing  
c l a s s  i n  mind,  f o r  i t  over tu rned  c a p i t a l i s m ,  the  s rs tem which e x p i o i t e d  
workers  f o r  i t s  ex i s tence .  I n t e l i e c t u a l s  and workers  had t o  a l l y  i n  some 
+ashion t o  break the back o f  the Sov ie t - t ype  system, e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  
r e v i s i o n i s t  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  f r e e  i n t e l l e c t u a i i t y  b u t  r e t a i n  i t s  e l e v a t e d  
p o s i t i o n  i n  communist ideo logy  f a i l e d  (Kennedy, 139 la ) .  S t u c t u r a l  f a c t o r s  
were c e r t a i n l y  i nvo l ved  i n  the making o i  the c ross -c l ass  a i l i a n c e  (see 
Kennedy, 19315, b u t  new modes o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r a x i s  were a l s o  impo r tan t .  
N a t i o n a l i s t  appeals  nigh1 organize workers  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t a  
communism, b u t  no t  necessar i ! y .  Some communist regimes, n o t i c e a b l y  
Ceaucescu's, mobi l i z e d  n a t  i o a l  ism and communism toge the r  t o  dominate . 
s o c i e t y .  And n a t i o n a l i s m  m igh t  serve t o  change the con ten t ,  b u t  l i t t l e  
o f  the p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a  s o c i e t y ,  as the r e b e l l i o n  a g a i n s t  
Georgia 's post-communist p res iden t  Zv iad  Gamsakhurdia suggests .  
A l t e r n a t i v e  w o r k e r i s t  o r  s y n d i c a l i s t  p o l i t i c s  d i m i n i s h e d  the r o l e  o f  the 
c u l t u r e d  t o o  much f o r  the h i g h l y  educa ted - to  f i n d  much a p p e a l ' i n  i t .  
C i v i l  s o c i e t y  soon became the idea l  v e h i c l e  f o r  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  and 
i n t e l  l e c t u a i  empowerment. 
The e l e v a t i o n  o f  the autonomous s e l f  r e g u l a t i n g  s o c i e t y  based on 
p l u r a l i s m ,  l e g a l i t y  and p u b l i c i t y ,  c i v i l  s o c i e t y ,  t o  the  v e h i c l e  and goal  
o f  change, was idea l  f o r  severa l  reasons. F i r s t ,  i t  appeared t o  be 
u n i v e r s a l  and i n c l u s i v e .  Everyone c o u l d  be a  f u l l  member o f  c i v i l  
s o c i e t y  t o  the  ex ten t  they  mere ly  ac ted  autonomously. Second, i t  c o u l d  
i nc l ude  w i t h i n  i t s  v i s i o n  the n a t i o n a i i s t  c a l l ,  i d e n t i f y i n g  i t s  propnents  
as ye t  another  independent s o c i a l  a s s o c i a t i o n .  T h i r d ,  i t  c o u l d  
i nco rpo ra te  workers ,  f o r  independent t rade  un ions  ~ o u l d  be one o f  the 
c o n s t i t u t i v e  elements o f  a  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  o f  f r e e  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  and t h i s  
would g i ven  the movement the power base i t  needed t o  c o n t e s t  the  
a u t h o r i t i e s  shou ld  they  w i sh  t o  use f o r c e .  Fou r th ,  i t  d i d  n o t  s p e l l  ou t  
p o l i t i c a l  economic re fo rms :  w h i l e  a  market o f  some k i n d  was assumed, the 
p r o p e r t y  r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  were t o  be i t s  base v a r i e d  f rom an embrace o f  the 
p r i v a t e  t o  t h a t  o f  s e l f  management. F i f t h ,  the embrace o f  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  
would appeal t o  the West. I t  was based on the  East Europeans' w i s h  t o  
become l i k e  the  West, l i k e  a  'normal' s o c i e t y .  And l a s t !  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  
was an i d e a l  v e h i c l e  f o r  e l e v a t i n g  the i n t e l l e c t u a l ' s  c l a i m  t o  
importance: f o r  i f  p u b l i c i t y  and o r g a n i z a t i o n  were the h a l l m a r k s  o f  the  
system, i n t e l l e c t u a l s  c o u l d  ac t  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t ,  w i t h  t h e i r  competence, 
and c o n t r i b u t e  t o  the making o f  an emancipator r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  And the 
making o f  post-communist regimes suggests t h a t  some i n t e l l e c t u a l s  
r e t a i n e d  t h e i r  importance. Ther nego t i a ted  the  t r a n s i t i o n  i n  most 
p laces ,  and won p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  i n  f r e e  e l e c t i o n s  t o o  (Kennedy, 
!992>. 
While of course communism in Eastern Europe did not collapse solely 
because of this mode of intellectual praxis, it w a s  an important 
ingredient in transforming those societies which led the post-communist 
charge! Hungary and Poland. I believe it a l s o  contributed to the making 
of the post-modern view. Before I explain how, allow me now to turn to 
that post-modern view, especially with its understanding of intellectuals. 
T H E  "INTELLECTUAL" AFTER MODERNITY CONSTITUTING'INTERPRETING SUBJECTS 
When w e  write of the "intellectual",. t o  what d o  I I J ~  refer? Our 
understanding of this identity depends on the larger theoretical 
framework w e  bring to our analysis. Perhaps more than other frameworks, 
the post-modern shift has altered our understanding of the intellectual, 
simultaneously exposing the intellectuals' dependence on power while 
diminishing the distinction of the category. 
Zrgmunt Bauman <I9871 argues that the principal benefit of the post- 
modern vision is that it allows u s  to see m o r e  clearly what distinguished 
modernity, by looking at that era irom an epistemological position from 
. . without. T h e  post-modern view allows u s  to see modernity's 
directionality in history, its inclination t o  find a master narrative 
with which to interpret that direction, and its fixing of both society 
and agents a s  essential in their constitution. The modern world view 
a l s o  elevates the intellectual to a supremely important position in the 
making of modernity and the future. Whether socialist or bourgeois, 
Azeri or Armenian, physician or chiropractor, the contest is over which 
inte! lectual better accesses the truth. T h e  post-modern world view 
enables u s  to see this common assumption. It also allows u s  to see the 
peculiarity of the identity, Vntellectual". 
According to Eauman, " intellectuals" is a social category of the 
modernity, having been coined only around the turn of the century in 
Western Europe. It w a s  designed to apply to those whose political 
consequence came through their representation of Reason, through their 
dissemination of knowledge to the public'and political leaders. The 
intriguing point, of course, w a s  that the term w a s  introduced only when 
the unity of Reason w a s  firing apart in the division of intellectual 
labor. T h e  timing of the term's introduction illustrates that this w a s  
not an easily defined category of pre-given identities, but rather a form 
of intellectual praxis. Constituting a new (because it unifed otherwise 
different actors) subject w a s  an accomplishment intended t o  elevate 
Reason in political affairs. It w a s  an attempt to reconnect specialized 
intellectual discourses into a larger community of the well-educated in 
order to elevate the significance of Reason in the ordering of the social 
world. Drawing upon the myth of les philosophes from France in the 
decades before the Revolution,l this project of self-definition by 
intellectuals w a s  an exercise in power, the making of a category that cut 
- against the movement of modernity's differentiation. But it w a s  also a 
project designed to save the claim of modernity to progress, namely to 
salvage Reason a s  a guiding force (pp. 21-24>. But while the' post-modern 
view allows u s  to see the distinction of the modern intellectual, it also 
m o v e s  the post-modern intellectual to embrace a new role. 
In modernity, the intellectual, according to Bauman, is rather the 
"legislator" of the new intrusive state. T h e  intel lectual provides the 
initial justification for state intervention, with a claim to a superior 
cultural disposition over the folk or masses.2 T h e  inteilectual 
embodied Reason; ideology w a s  the metatheory that would organize society 
in a better w a y ,  in a "conscious, rational, ideological order" .(Bauman, 
1991:112). Power becomes then "the content and the consequence of all the 
tasks ideology would have to put in front of itself" (Bauman, 1991:112). 
Although the intellectuals' power is to be based on "persuasion", it w a s  
a persuasion backed up by the coercive force of a state which w a s  eager 
to convince the populace that their "wants" are not their "true needs" 
(Bauman, 1991 :1131, Legislating i n t e l l e c t u a ! ~  rely on their power to 
access the needs of those w h o  don't know better. 
T h e  state E.oon loses the need for an intellectual t o  provide 
justification a s  the state's intrusive power becomes increasingly self- 
evident and without need of the intellectuals' legitimation. In that 
outcome, the intellectual's function changes to become either the 
"autonomous", but powerless, intellectual, on the one hand, or the 
empowered but limited expert with competence in a singular field without 
teleological claim, on fhe other. 
T h e  post-modern intellectual is different from each of these modern 
variants because this intellectual is again political. But rather than 
claim any "superior" knowledge t o  legislate political communities, the 
post-modern intellectual a c t s  a s  the "interpreter", the intellectual w h o  
translates the needs of one cultural community into a discourse 
understandable by those from without. Even the intellectuals w h o  
represent the dominant system rarely act, Bauman argues, a s  legislative 
intellectuals of old and rather wish only t o  "defend our w a y  of life", 
rather than try and bring Reason to those w h o  are incapable of living it. 
And those modern intellectuals w h o  continue t o  wish t o  legislate d o  s o  on 
the basis of their recognition that it is a praiseworthy, even if local 
tradition, that western inteliectuals, like Richard Rorty, find CBauman, 
1989:328>. 
Rorty's il991:488) own unsympathetic description of h i s  example of 
the post-modern intellectual, Andrew Ross, is interesting on this score: 
More generailr, Professor Ross wants his students t o  stop 
assuming that they, a s  prospective intellectuals, will be in a 
posi t ion to teach the uneducated what i t is they real ly need and to 
suggest to them how tney might get it. T h e  whole idea oi 
intellectuals knowing something that non-intellectuals should know 
but d o  not is, for Ross, largely a refusal to recognize and 
respect difference. 
Rortr's hostility to some post-modern social theory, especially for its 
political consequence, is not hidden in this essay. But the point i want 
to draw upon here is that one of the premiere "modern" US intellectuals 
sees,terrific difference between his intellectuality and that of the 
post-modern. I t  is not just a case of the post-modern m a k i n g  a difference 
where otherwise there would be none. Bauman's case allows u s  to see from 
without the contenst the justification for distinguishing the modern from 
the post-modern intellectual. Bauman's is the clearest, most direct and 
perhaps the most dangerous ly  s imple a v a i l a b l e .  But  i n  i t s  bas i c  
argument, I t h i n k  i t  i s  r i g h t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  we m igh t  develop i t  i n  two 
more s teps .  
F i r s t ,  post -modern i ty  n o t  o n l y  emphasizes the d i f f e r e n c e  o f  present  
f rom p a s t ,  b u t  a l s o  more r a d i c a l l y  severs  t he  p resen t  f rom the f u t u r e  
w h i l e  mode rn i t y  t r i e d  t o  connect them. The modern i n t e l l e c t u a l  was 
connected, through Reason, t o  the making o f  a  b e t t e r  f u t u r e .  Wh i le  Marx, 
Weber, and Freud understood the p resen t  i n  terms o f  the f u t u r e  i t  c o u l d  
y i e l d ,  post-modern pe rspec t i ves  a re  much more backward- looking, 
emphasizing how d isconnec ted  p resen t  i d e n t i t i e s  a re  f rom those p a s t ,  and 
w i t h  t h a t  move, showing how imposs ib le  i t  i s  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  any k i n d  o f  
f u t u r e ,  be i t  e i t h e r  a  smooth ex tens ion  o f  the  p resen t  o r  i t s  r a d i c a l  
t r ans fo rma t  ion.  T h i s  makes the post-modern i n t e l  l e c t u a l  a  p r i s o n e r  o f  
o p p o s i t i o n ,  and makes th.e assumption o f  a u t h o r i t y  i n  l e g i s l a t i n g  systems 
imposs ib le .  A u t h o r i t y  r e q u i r e s  n o t  o n l y  l e g i s l a t i o n !  b u t  the p r o j e c t i o n  
o f  the f u t u r e  from the systemic cho ices  made i n  the  p resen t .  I t  i nvo l ves  
the  suppress ion o f  i d e n t i t i e s  and d i f f e r e n c e  i n  the name o f  an i dea l  
which i s  the  p r o j e c t i o n  o f  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l ' s ,  o r  l e g i s l a t o r ' s ,  own 
i den t  i t y .  
Second, I t h i n k  Ro r t y  i s  r i g h t .  The post-modern w o r l d  v iew devalues 
the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and her  e x c l u s i v i t y ,  even i f  i t  does f i n d  a  new mode o f  
i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y .  I n t e l l e c t u a l  work i s  no t  so  d i f f e r e n t  f rom o t h e r  forms 
o f  work, and most c e r t a i n l y  does n o t  r ep resen t  a  " c u l t u r a l l y  s u p e r i o r "  
knowledge. But one fo rm o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y  i s  q u i t e  new i n  the 
p e r s p e c t i v e .  Michel  Foucau l t ' s  work i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  novel  
i n t e l  l e c t u a i  i t y ,  b u t  a l s o  shows q u i t e  n i c e l y  why the i n t e l l e c t u a l ' s  
p o s i t i o n  i s  deualued, and perhaps why i t  i s  so  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
i n t e l  l e c t l i a l s  again t o  assume po l  i t ' i c a l  au thor  i t y .  
FOUCAULT3S DIMINISHED INTELiECTUAL 
Foucau l t  does n o t  argue t h a t  pos t -modern i t y ,  as a  p e r i o d ,  devalues 
the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p o s i t i o n .  F o u c a u l t ' s  d i s c u r s i v e  t u r n  devalues the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  i n  a l l  pe r i ods .  He exposes the i n t e l l e c t u a l s '  s e l f  
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  as the vo i ce  o f  Reason o r  Progress  i n  modern i t y .  I n  
t h i s  sense, post -modern i ty  r e f e r s  t o  a p e r s e p c t i v e  t h a t  m igh t  be used t o  
assess o t h e r  h i s t o r i c a l  pe r i ods .  Post -modern i ty  as  pe rspec t i ve  I s  
dependent f o r  i t s  development, however, on i t s  f o rma t i on  i n  the 1970's as 
a  more i n f l u e n t i a l  i f  no t  dominant c u l t u r a l  mode i n  the West. I n  bo th  
p e r s p e c t i v e  and p e r i o d ,  the i n t e l l e c t u a l s '  dependence on power and the 
p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s  o f  l o c a i  c u f t u r e ,  r a t h e r  than on u n i v e r s a l  Reason i n  anr 
o f  i t s  garbs,  becomes a  c e n t r a l  c l a im .  And w i t h  t h a t  r e j e c t i o n  of 
u n i v e r s a l  Reason as  a  l e g i t i m a t i o n  f o r  c e r t a i n  c u l t u r a l  dominance, the 
l eg i  s l  a t  i ve r o l e  o f  i n  t e l l  ec t u a l  s  i s  underm i ned. 
On normat ive grounds! Foucau l t  r e j e c t s  e x p l i c i t l y  the l e g i s l a t i v e  
r o l e s  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  around him. Indeed, he c r i t i c i z e s  r a t h e r  d i r e c t l - y  
n o t  o n l y  the g l oba l  t h e o r i e s  and sys temat ic  accounts  which den ig ra te  
l o c a l  forms o f  knowledge, b u t  a l s o  the " u n i v e r s a l  i n t e l l e c t u a l s n  who 
c l a i m  t o  represen t  Reason o r  Conscience (1977:67-68). Such a  u n i v e r s a l  
c l a im ,  and the regime o f  knowledge t h a t  e l e v a t e s  i t ,  disempower and make 
l e s s  p o s s i b l e  the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of c o n d i t i o n s  by o r d i n a r y  people.  
On empirical grounds, the intellectual becomes less capable over 
time of claiming such universal consequence. With the development o f  
science and its extension t o  all domains of material and social life, the 
specific intellectual w i t h  a particular rather than general expertise 
eventual ly el iminates the general intellectual's claims t o  relevance. 
But the specific intellectual's knowledge need not lose world historic 
consequence. T h e  atomic scientist is the dramatic example used by 
Foucault to illustrate the potency of specific knowledge. But Foucault 
takes u s  beyond Oppenheimer and the Bhagavad Gita to a a more general 
argument that the most effective praxis for intellectuals is to try t o  
pull out f u m  u i l h i n  -their nun unrksi-te how power shapes truth (Foucault, 
1977). 
T h e  peculiarity of the intellectuai is diminished in this framework. 
Indeed, Foucault emphasizes that the specific intellectual is closer to 
the "masses" because they are confronted by the same adversary and have 
the same material concerns of the proletariat C1977:68). T h e  last 
remaining reserve of the general intellectual is the academy, which 
operates a s  a point through which all intellectuals must at some time 
pass, and through which ideas are exchanged. 
In this, Foucault is far from being apol i tical and also far from the 
relativism with which the unsympathetic often charge him. He rather 
views intellectual work a s  a potentiai contributor to the critique of the 
scientization of knowledge and its associated power (1980). But in this, 
does the inte.llectua1 have any special competence or contribution beyond 
that of the "ordinary" individual? I s  the intellectual different from 
the ordinary person? Is "intellectuality" any different from 
"knowledgeabi 1 i ty"? What enables u s  to talk' of the intel lectual in a 
separate category, a s  a distinct identity? 
Foucault elevates certain kinds of intellectual work in the struggle 
against domination.3 It s e e m s  that the reverse discourses associated 
with every day resistance are different from the geneological research 
that recovers meanings m o r e  e+fectively repressed, those around which 
reverse discourses d o  not form. T h i s  research seeks t o  emphasize the 
complexity and contingency of historical formation, while reverse 
discourses need not embrace such complications in their resistance of 
dominant discourses. G e n e a o l o g ~  accomplishes more than knowledge based 
on perspective, for it reveals the w a y s  in which perspectives are made by 
their own natural irat ion a n d  the suppression of a1 ternat ives. Hopeful ly, 
then! the intellectual might facilitate local f o r m s  of resistance. 
genealogy a s  critique refers t o  the association or union between 
'erudite knowledge a n d  local memories', between retrieved f o r m s  of 
historical knowledge of conflicts and strugge and low-status 
unqualified or disqualified knowledges ... respectively" (Smart, 
1985:61). 
Thus, while Foucault's intellectual is being more than Bauman's 
interpreter for communities, the political consequence of her work 
hopefully is to empower dispossessed communities by revealing their 
1 ocal i z e d  know1 edge. 
Despite the possible elevation of the intellectual, role beyond the 
status of reverse discourse, Foucault's profound pessimism about 
fundamental change or emancipation ultimately diminishes the 
intellectual's potential significance. Rather than intellectuals helping 
to provide a direction to history, Foucault rather s e e s  the succession of 
m o d e s  of domination (1977a) Consequently, critical intellectuals remain 
in a state of perpetual opposition, uncovering silences'and illuminating 
contradictions, recovering the past omissions rather than helping to 
emancipate the future. 
One implication of this is that intellectuality itself, to realize 
its critical responsibility, opens itseif up t o  power's fragmentation of 
the world by exposing the silences and repressions it h a s  managed. But 
the success of the critical project in Foucauldian terms may be the 
fragmentation of intellectuality itself into a series of more and more 
distinct representations of the local. And therewith, the distinction of 
intellectuality a s  a level or form of knowledge is made even more 
suspicious, for intellectualitr, rather than located on one rung of some 
kind of ladder, is rather located in more horizontal space, distinguished 
not by its superiority, or even its intellectual authority, but by its 
very marginality from power. T h e  differences between intellectuals, 
rather than their commonality, is elevated. T h e  impossiblities of 
critical intellectuality in authority exposed. 
Whiie a peculiar kind of research is identified in Foucauldian work, 
the exclusivitr of intellectuals a s  a social group is diminished by the 
Foucauldian move, precisely because of this location of the intellectual 
in horizontal, rather than hierarchical space. T h e  intel!ectuals' 
significance for political change is thus eclipsed. 
POST-MODERNITY'S POLITICAL INTELLECTUALS 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) manage to restore the significance of the 
intel lectual , whi l~ simul taneouslr making more directly pol i tical the 
post-modern project. By elevating the problem of "hegemony", Laclau and 
Mouffe restore the intellectual to some significance, but within the 
post-modern position a s  the "interpreter" rather than a s  a legislator of 
the future, a s  Bauman argues. But they aiso illustrate m y  other point 
about the post-modern intellectual. Laclau a n d  Mouffe explicitly 
criticize the efforts of intellectuals in trying to make a connection 
between the heterogenei ty of the present with the total i tr of the present 
and the (Sociaiistj Reason of the future. Of course here they argue with 
Marxism, their principal representative of modernity. 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that the social ly fragmented proletariat 
required the political intervention of intellectuals t o  maintain its 
rational unity. T h e  tendency toward the fragmentation of the working 
class even before World War I required a political initiative that would 
somehow restore the unity of the proletariat in its struggle for 
socialism. Intellectuals., in this project, assumed responsibility for the 
effects of "contingency", for the working c l a s s  and its being moved 
toward the resolution of its exploitation in socialism. But a s  the 
contingent grew in its importance for explaining the failure to realize 
socialism, s o  too would the role of political intellectuals increase in 
t he  s o c i a l i s t  p r o j e c t  ( p .  25:). The r e v i s i o n i s t  p r o j e c t  o n l y  s t reng3hened 
t h i s  tendency, b r  making t he  p o l i t i c a l  even more c o n s t i t u t i v e  o f  the 
c l a s s  base o f  the  s o c i a l i s t  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  f p .  325. Len in ' s  
r e f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  the  m a r x i s t  p r o j e c t  r e a l i z e d  i t s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  p o t e n t i a l  
by  l i n k i n g  p o l i t i c s  t o  the d i s c o v e r y  o f  a  c l a s s  c o n s t i t u t e d  and p reg i ven  
i n  h i s t o r y ,  hefnrre p o l i t i c s  Cpp. 57-59). P o l i t i c a l  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  were 
t h u s  a t  the helm o f  the new s o c i a l i s t  p r o j e c t .  But the  e l e v a t i o n  o f  
con t ingency  need n o t  e l e v a t e  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  a s  the  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  Sore1 
and r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s y n d i c a l i s m  suggests  (pp. 36-42>. 
The e l e v a t i o n  o f  the i n t e l l e c t u a l  i s  r e t a i n e d  o n l y  when the  
c o n t i n g e n t  remains connected t o  the r a t i o n a l  and de te rminan t .  
For  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  a re  u n i q u e l y  s u i t e d ,  i t  seems, t o  connect s t r a t e g y  t o  
movement i n  h i s t o r y ,  and t h u s  remain u n i q u e l y  w i t h i n  the modern p r o j e c t .  
Bu t  once the modern p r o j e c t  i s  abandoned, as  i t  i s  w i t h  S o r e l ' s  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  synd i ca l i sm ,  the  "mora l "  o r  the  " w i l l "  i s  no longer  the 
e x c l u s i v e  p r o j e c t  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  I t  is ,  r a t h e r ,  the  p r o j e c t  o f  t he  
commun i t y  i n  f o r m a t i o n  th rough  the  necessary myth o f  the genera l  s t r  i ke .  
Synd ica l i sm,  i n  t h i s  v a r i a n t  a t  l e a s t ,  a n t i c i p a t e s  the  movement toward 
the  post-modern and the d i m u n i t i o n  o f  the i n t e l l e c t u a l  r o l e .  Both 
e l e v a t e  the n a t u r a l  community t o  be something t o  be d i scove red  i n  popu la r  
m o b l i z a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  than i n  the  r a t i o n a l  c o n s t r u c t s  o f  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l .  
Bu t  t h i s  i s  t o o  r a d i c a l  (and t o o  a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l  o r  popu ! i s t ? )  a  t u r n .  
Lac l au  and Mouf fe  cons ider  Gramsc i ' s  a r t i c u l a t i o n  as  a  more a p p f o p r i a t e  
f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  t h e i r  r a d i c a l  democrat ic  p o l i t i c s .  
A l though  Gramsci does n o t  take them f a r  enough, he does p r o v i d e  t he  
sp r i ngboa rd  f o r  t h e i r  conc lus i ons :  F i r s t ,  t he  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the 
necessary  and c o n t i n g e n t  i s  d i s s o l v e d  i n  f a v o r  o f  r e t h i n k i n g  the  u n f i x i t y  
o f  s o c i a l  f o r c e s .  There i s  no necessary  l i n k  between s o c i a l i s m  and 
conc re te  s o c i a l  agents .  The meaning o f  new s o c i a l  movements, t h i s  
e x p l o s i o n  o f  t he  s o c i a l ,  depends on t h e i r  a r t i c u l a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  
s t r u g g l e s  and demands. But  t h i s  then means, above a l l ,  t h a t  the 
movements' s e p a r a t i o n  f rom one another  cannot be i t s e l f  f i x e d .  I n s t e a d ,  
t hey  t u r n  t o  the r o l e  o f  i n t e r p r e t e r  br t r y i n g  t o  a r t i c u l a t e  a  new 
counter-hegemony which w i l l  a l l o w  new s o c i a l  movements t o  r e a l i z e  t h e i r  
p rog ress i ve  r o l e  (pp.  85-88:). The i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  i n  t h e i r  work,  becomes a  
" s u b j e c t  p o s i t i o n "  wh ich  i s  o b l i g e d  t o  address t h e i r  " c e n t r a l  prob lem".  
t o  i d e n t i f y  the  d i s c u r s i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the  emergence o f  a  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  d i r e c t e d  toward s t r u g g l i n g  a g a i n s t  i n e q u a l i t i e s  
and c h a l l e n g i n g  r e l a t i o n s  o f  s u b o r i d i n a t i o n .  We m igh t  a l s o  say 
t h a t  our  task  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  the c o n d i t i o n s  i n  which a  r e l a t i o n  o f  
s u b o r d i n a t i o n  becomes a  r e l a t i o n  o f  oppress ion ,  and thereby 
c o n s t i t u t e s  i t s e l f  i n t o  the  s i t e  o f  an antagonism (p .  153).  
The i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  then,  manages t o  r e t a i n  her  " e x t e r i o r "  p o s i t i o n ,  as  she 
had w i t h  her  connec t i on  t o  Reason. But now, the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  i s  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  o n l y  by  v i r t u e  o f  her  a b i l i t y  t o  t r a n s l a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  ,of 
s u b o r d i n a t i o n  i n t o  d i s c u r s i v e l r  e x p l i c i t  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  oppress ion  Cp. 
1541. Democracy i s  deepened t o  the  e x t e n t  t h a t  more and more r e l a t i o n s  
o f  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  a re  r econs ide red  as  oppress ion  (p .  163); hence, c r i t i c a l  
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  can p l a y  a  v i t a l  general r o l e ?  n o t  o n l y  as advocates o f  a  
community's i n t e r e s t s ,  as F o u c a u l t ' s  ex tens ion  suggests ,  b u t  i n  the v e r y  
expansion and deepening o f  the  normat i ve  frame o f  t h e i r  a n a l y s i s ,  democracy. 
T h e  formation of contending blocs is the great contribution of the 
tradition from Gramsci through Laclau and Mouffe, and is what leads 
Radhakrishnan (1990) ultimately to intermix Foucault with Gramsci, rather 
than the other way around, in his ruminations on the "effective 
intellectualn (p. 915. But unlike the Gramscian rendition, the post- 
modern reading of bloc formation and democratic transformation has no 
telos. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) speak directly to this: 
the democratic revolution is simply the terrain upon which there 
operates a logic of displacement supported by an egalitarian 
imaginary, but that does not predetermine the direrfion in which 
this imaginary will operate. If this direction were predetermined 
w e  should simply have constructed a new teleology ..." (p. 168).  
And there is no qualitative break, either: 
There is n o  unique privileged position from which a uniform 
continuitr of eifects will follow, concluding with the 
transformation of society a s  a whole (p. 1692. 
T h i s  profound indeterminism is a consequence of identities and their 
distinctions from one another having become more and more fluid, and 
subject to reconstruction, evidenced by the ascendence of the 
neoconservative project in post-modernity. For Laclau and Mouffe, then, 
the important project of critical intellectuals is to reformulate 
democracy and create a new definition around which a historic bloc of 
more progressive egalitarian orientation toward liberty would emerge. For 
that project to emerge, intellectuals come to the fore once again, in 
providing the "radical imaginary", the utopia, which helps to negate the 
existing order, while of course avoiding the extreme of the "Ideal City" 
Ip. 190). T h e  ambition is to create a new hegemony. T h i s  is a hegemony 
of opposition, however. 
T H E  INTELLECTUALITIES OF POST-MODERNIN AND POST-COMMUNISM 
Post-modernity's suspicion of the intellectual's claim to superior 
knowledge means that the intellectual's role cannot become more than an 
interpreter of local visions, or the archaeologist of lost visions. 
Laclau and Mouffe certainly elevate the role of the intellectual in 
political struggles above that which Foucault provided for, by making the 
intellectual an important contributor to the formation of alternative 
hegemonies, But they certainly retain the disdain of the post-modern 
project for the intellectual's old legislating role in society making. 
The only institutionalization of Reason they are prepared to acknowledge 
is the. discourse of democracy and its legitimation of pluralism, which 
they perceive a s  a procedural foundation for the discursive 
transformation of subordination into oppression. Thus! while certainly 
making post-modernity a more political vision than Foucault, and while 
elevating the role of the intellectual, Laclau and Mouffe retain the 
important hallmark of the post-modern vis.ion: of an intellectual a s  
interpreter. Without a connection to the Totality through an imaginary 
system, or to the Future with an imaginary motor, intellectuals can d o  
no more. But, in fact, they do, and sometimes, they must. 
When Chantal  Mouf fe  v i s i t e d  the U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M i ch igan  on September 
21, 1989, I s ~ ' ~ g e s t e d  t o her  t h a t  t h e i r  argument about p o l  i t i c a l  
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  would be o f  l i t t l e  va lue t o  the l e g i s l a t i n g  e f f o r t s  f a c i n g  
the P o l i s h  and Hungarian i n t e l l e c t u a l s  then assuming p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y .  
And she agreed, a rgu ing  t h a t  the c r i t i c a l  i n t e l l e c t u a l  shou ld  remain i n  
opposi  t ion ,  deepening democracy through c r  i t i que. But wh i 1.e t h i s  does 
n o t  deny 'a1 t e r n a t  i v  i t y  i n  l e g i s l a t i n g  systems, espec ia l  lr i n  Eas te rn  
Europe, i t  does mean t h a t  post-modern i n t e l l e c t u a l s  a re  n o t  h e l p i n g  pos t -  
communist i n t e l l e c t u a l s  v e r y  much. Post-communist a u t h o r i t i e s  a re  
i ns tead  l e g i s l a t i n g  new s o c i a l  systems based on the adv i ce  o f  modern i t y ' s  
i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  And t h a t  seems t o  be a  p ro found  l i m i t a t i o n  f o r  pos t -  
modern i t y ' s  p o l  i t i c a l  consequence. 
Mi t h  the dec l  ine o f  s o c i a l  ism as coun te rcu l  t u r e ,  post-modern i t y  
becomes the main a l t e r n a t i v e  c o u n t e r c u l t u r e  i n  the West. O r  a t  l e a s t  i t s  
advocates m igh t  c l a i m  t h a t .  But w h i l e  pos t -modern i t y  be u s e f u l  i n  the 
development o f  c r i t i c a l  i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y  i n  the West where democracy can 
be deepened r a t h e r  than es tab l i shed ,  a t  p resen t  i t  seems t o  o f f e r s  l i t t l e  
t o  those i n t e l l e c t u a l s  who must s t i l l  l e g i s l a t e  systems. I s  i t  poss ib l e .  
f o r  the post-modern view t o  o f f e r  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  i n  a u t h o r i t y  any 
guidance, any v i s i o n ?  O r  do i n t e l l e c t u a . 1 s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  by 
n e c e s s i t y  r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  r o l e  i n  the beg inn ings  o f  mode rn i t y :  p r o v i d i n g  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  f o r  the suppress ion o f  popu la r  wants on the b a s i s  o f  knowing 
the p u b l i c ' s  t r u e  needs? 
To a  g r e a t  ex ten t  t h i s  has been a  moot ques t i on  f o r  i n  the 
met ropo le ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  a re  m a r g i n a l i z e d  f r om power f o r  the most p a r t .  
Too, the post-modern seems t o  have r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  t o  o f f e r  s t r u g g l e  i n  
cap i t a l  ism's o i  d  p e r i p h e r y ,  g iven  the even g r e a t e r  d i s t a n c e  o f  
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  f rom power t he re ,  and the more l i k e l y  embrace by i t s  
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  o f  some v a r i a n t  o f  marxism, one o f  post-modernism's main 
f oes .  But i n  the p lace  t h a t  t r e a t s  marxism as demon, and the p l ace  where 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  have access t o  power, i n  c a p i t a l i s m ' s  new p e r i p h e r y ,  i t s  
post-communist pe r i phe ry ,  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  post-modern i n f l u e n c e  i s  
r e l a t i v e l y  g r e a t .  For  t he re ,  the v i s i o n s  o f  post-communist and pos t -  
modern i n t e l l e c t u a l s  a l s o  have some assumptions i n  common.4 
1) I n  bo th  pos t -modern i t y  and post-communism, the " S t a t e u  i s  a  f a r  more 
obv ious  and t h r e a t e n i n g  a c t o r ,  no ma t te r  what r u l i n g  c l a s s  i t  c l a i m s  t o  
r ep resen t .  The e l e v a t i o n  o f  an autonomous c i v i l  s o c i e t y  as  a  s i n e  qua non 
o f  the good s o c i e t y  i s  embraced no t  o n l y  i n  the post-communist (most 
obously  i n  M i c h n i k ,  1976) b u t  a l s o  i n  the post-modern v i s i o n  I L a c l a u  and 
Mouf fe ,  1985:152-71). 
2)  The c r i s i s  o f  Sov ie t - t ype  s o c i e t y  a l s o  made c l a i m s  t o  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  o the rs '  unknown or  unrecognized i n t e r e s t s  even more 
f a n t a s t i c a l l y  u n r e l i a b l e .  The i n t e l l e c t u a l  mode i n  c i v i l  s o c i e t y ,  i n  
f a c t ,  was n o t  t o  c l a i m  t o  speak f o r  anyone, b u t  o n l y  t o  a c t  as an expe r t  
p r o v i d i n g  adv ice  t o  the s o c i a l  body, o r  as an a c t o r ,  n o t  a supe r i o r  
i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  w i t h i n  t h a t  s o c i a l  body i t s e l f .  I n t e l l e c t u a l s  were on bo th  
s i d e s  o i  the e x p e r t / a c t i i i s t  d i v i d e  (Kurczewski ,  1989). T h i s  i s  m o s t l y  
the  case i n  Poland, however, where s o c i a l  f o r c e s  beyond t he  
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  were most developed; b u t  even i n  Hungary, where the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  was q u i t e  a lone i n  speaking f o r  c i v i l  s o c i e t y ,  the 
intelligentsia w a s  quite hesitant in negotiations to speak on h W f  of 
civil society (Kennedy, 1992). 
3)  T h e  crisis also transformed the view of history; n o  longer w a s  the 
future considered a march of progress or reason, but rather a series of 
accidents. For example, the fate of Poland a n d  its occupation by the Red 
Armr after World W a r  I1 inspired an illuminating exchange in the New York 
Review of Books about the moral responsiblity of actors t o  fight the 
inevitable, but accidental outcomes of war (Kolakowski 1986; Draper, 
1986). Leszek Kolakocgski is one of the principal intel lectual - 
contributors t o  the post-communist project throughout Eastern Europe. 
4 )  T h e  relationship of power to knowledge also became more explicit in 
post-communism and post-modernitr. Without a analogous body of 
autonomous social power, given to Polish intellectuals by the organized 
and independent Polish working class, Hungarian intellectuals felt 
obliged to compromise and work with the authorities to achieve reform. 
Principles were neither transcendent nor dependent on class forces, but 
rather dependent on the articulation of social forces (Kennedy, 19921. 
I Of course one fundamental difference between post-communist and 
-- - post-modern perspectives w a s  in the capacity of the former to identify 
m- 
the "normaln and 'good" society: that of the West with its relatively 
developed c iv i 1 soc iety. T h e  post-modern view h a s  relat iuely more 
difficulty with such simple descriptions of systemic alternatives. 
Another fundamental difference, and the most disconcerting one, is 
the ease with which these post-communist intellectuals have been able to 
forget their rather self-limiting claims about representation, and 
embrace the old legislating mode of modern intellectuals. In part, this 
is of necessity, of course; political authority h a s  been thrust in their 
laps. 'But at the same time, the embrace of the modern bourgeois 
intellectual approach to legislating systems h a s  their origins not only 
in the collapse of socialism a s  capitalism's counterculture, but also in 
post-moderni ty's failure to develop an intellectual pol it ics of author i ty. 
I conclude t h i s  section with an important observation: this mode of 
intellectuality, this post-communist embrace of civil society in the 
Soviet-type system? w a s  one of the most effective forms of critical 
intellectuality this century has witnessed. While it h a s  shown its 
limits after the revolutions of 1989, its revolutionary accomplishment 
cannot be overlooked for whatever its subsequent failure. Indeed, it 
might yet be restored should it find new alliance with the post-modern, 
rather than only the modern, intellectual. But now, that is the only 
real a1 ly they have. 
INTELLECTUALS OF MODEPNITY CONSTITUTING SYSTEMS 
Most of the intellectual authorities making post-communism are 
modernity's intellectuals: specialists with a claim to competence in only 
one narrow field. But while they m a r  be specialists, they claim 
something n o  post-modernist would dare: that their field of expertise 
carries systemic consequences, and that their advice is the best that 
they can get. And whether they are right or wrong, their voice is 
helping t o  shape the post-communist system. 
I am presently engaged in researching the expertise constituting 
post-communist Poland, and unfortunately I have not completed enough of 
m y  research at this time say anything conclusive. But I can provide some 
rough comments. 
In the summer of 15'91, Poland's university intellectuals were, for 
the most part, discouraged: T h e  Mazowiecki government passed a bill on 
higher education that decentralized authority over higher education, 
making each actor a s  self reliant a s  possible. When taken in conjunction 
with the democratic transformations of the institutions of higher 
education that took place over the 1980's, Poland's intelligentsia w a s  
now a s  autonomous a s  could be. But they were also desparately seeking 
to become "modern", if not equally across the board. 
Polish historians, lawyers, humanists, theoretical physicists and 
even some sociologists have n o  need to become more "modern". Surely they 
can have more international collaboration, but the desparation t o  learn 
w a s  more easily seen in economics and business. Indeed, Western 
perceptions are such that professional economists are much less 
appreciative of their East European counterparts' competence than are 
those in other fields. 
Easily the most dynamic sector of the field of higher education, and 
perhaps the only confident field, w a s  that associated with " b ~ s i n e s s " .  
Five existing Academies of Economics are moving toward becoming m o r e  like 
Business Schools, and entirely new Business schools are forming, outside 
the old system of higher education. Indeed, the British Know-Hag Fund 
expl ici tly targeted money toward Pol ish intel lectuals wi 1 1  ing to start up 
business schools outside the old, inertia ridden system Csee Kennedy, 
1991c, for elaboration). 
These developments are, of course, entirely consistant with the 
post-modern view, especially in its Foucauldian form: knowledge a n d  power 
are inextricably intertwined s o  that those intellectuals most confident 
of the future are those simultaneously receiving funds from more 
"powerful" advisors. When w e  add to this comparatively minor injection 
of expertise the considerable competence claimed by representatives of 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bani! in dictating the 
character of Polish economic reform (see Kowalik, 19911, w e  can s e e  quite 
easily the point of the link between knowledge and power. 
One principal kind of expertise is being elevated in this making of . 
post-communism: that of the free market economist. Indeed, the s o  called 
"government of experts" under Jan Krzysztof Bielecki w a s  based on the 
number of professional economists in the Cabinet. Clearly, the expertise 
of the free-market economist is the hegemonic intellectuality remaking 
post-communism today. 
T h e  proximity of the economist to state power and the making of 
systems is of course not exclusive to the post-communist world. T h e y  
only reflect world and core capitalism's elevation of the economist a s  
the only intellectual with the capacity to legislate, or at least 
regulate, social systems. Another intellectuality that is becoming quite 
important in the making of post-communism is that of the constitutional 
l awyer .  T h i s  i s  an e s p e c i a l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  deuelopment, too ,  as i t  
c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  the " d i s c o u e r r "  by many s o c i o l o g i s t s  o f  the "modern" 
persuas ion  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a re  s o c i o l o g i c a l l y  f ounda t i ona l  f o r  making 
democracy. 
A t  the Annual Meet ing  o f  the Hungarian S o c i o l o g i c a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  i n  
1991, two ou t  o f  t h ree  p l e n a r y  speakers f rom ou t s i de  Hungary devoted 
t h e i r  comments t o  the importance o f  s o c i o l o g i s t s  s t u d y i n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  
(James Coleman and Shmuel E i s e n s t a d t ) .  P reda t i ng  them, however, was 
another  s o c i o l o g i s t  o f  mode rn i t y  who argued t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a re  the 
c o d i f i e d  u n i v e r s a l i s m  t h a t  enable democracy t o  f u n c t i o n .  
J e f f e r y  A lexander ,  i n  h i s  n e o f u n c t i o n a l i s t  p r o j e c t  t o  r e s u r r e c t  
T a l c o t t  Parsons as the o n l y  g ~ e a t  t h e o r i s t  o f  a  s t a b l e  modern i t y  
(1990) ,  r e i n t r o d u c e s  the famous Parsonsian theme o f  va lue  consensus i n  a 
new impor tan t  way. Whi le he con t inues  t o  argue t h a t  e l i t e  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and c o m p e t i t i o n  are the s t r u c t u r a l  f ounda t i ons  f o r  
democracy's success (1991:160), he argues t h a t  there  must be a  u n i v e r s a l  
c u l t u r a l  f ounda t i on  as w e l l .  
For A lexander ,  the c u l  t u r a l  dimension o f  democracy's a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  
be found i n  the "deep symbol ic  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  p rov ide  a  common medium o f  
communication f o r  c o n f l i c t  groups desp i t e  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  and d i v i s i v e  
aims" (p.  1621, f o r  i t  i s  " t h e  language o f  community and i n t e g r a t i o n  ... 
( t h a t )  i s  a  code t h a t  s u s t a i n s  democracy wherever i t  even f l e e t i n g l y  
appearsn (p .  162). These u n i v e r s a l i t i c  codes are c rea ted ,  Alexander 
argues, i n  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  i t s e l f  i p .  166).  
I n  t h i s  c i v i l  s o c i e t y ,  the p a r t i c u l a r  g i v e s  way t o  the u n i v e r s a l ,  
and more a b s t r a c t  c r i t e r i a  f o r  membership, and i n c l u s i o n ,  are g iven .  And 
i t  i s  the r u l e s  o f  t h i s  membership which g i ues ,  Alexander argues, the 
p o s s i b l i t y  o f  v o l u n t a r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  freedom and democracy: "Because 
the u l t i m a t e  l o y a l t y  o f  c i t i z e n s  i s  t o  ove ra rch ing  r u l e s  r a t h e r  than t o  
the outcome o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  game, p o l  i c i e s  and o f f  i ceho lde rs  can be 
changed, though the process may be d i f f i c u l t  and sub jec t  t o  c o n t i n u a l  
c o n t e s t a t i o n "  i p .  1685. And Alexander argues t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  c o d i f y  
these overach ing  r u l e s  t h a t  i n t e g r a t e .  A  democrat ic  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
becomes, then, one o f  the s o c i a l  r e q u i s i t e s  o f  democracy (p .  171).  
For A lexander ,  democracy should be understood as an idea l  type,  and 
t hus  r a r e l y  r e a l i z e d  i n  p r a c t i c e .  But he manages t o ' e s t a b l i s h  the s o c i a l  
f ounda t i ons  o f  the normat ive good, democracy, and then t o  suggest t h a t  
d e v i a t i o n s  f rom these f ounda t i ons  are themselves the exp lana t i on  f o r  
democracy's f a i l u r e .  Soc ia l  c r i s i s ,  he argues, undermines the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  democracy. "Democracy i s  p reserved  o n l y  i f  common ground 
i s  sus ta ined ,  i f  i t  proves p o s s i b l e  t o  ensure the genera l i zed ,  
u n i v e r s a l i s t i c  bonds t h a t  a l l o w  c r i t i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n  t o  be sus ta i ned  
w i t h o u t  s a c r i f i c i n g  s o c i a l  s o l  i d a r i t y "  (p.  1715. 
Whi le  the post-modern uiew has so f a r  had l i t t l e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
r e f o r m u l a t i n g  the economic p r o j e c t  o f  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund, i t  
m i g h t ,  one would imagine, have a  g rea t  deal  more t o  say about t h i s  m a t t e r  
04 democracy, c i v i l  s o c i e t y  and i n t e g r a t i o n .  And o f  course i t  does, b u t  
Alexander and the n e o f u n c t i o n a l i s t  p r o j e c t  i n  soc io l ogy  seem t o  proceed 
as i f  the post-modern i s  i r r e l e v a n t .  Indeed, Alexander manages t o  moue 
the post-modern c r i t i q u e  o f  power and s o c i e t y  t o  the s i d e  r a t h e r  w e l l .  
He d ismisses  Foucau l t  w i t h  an a p p r e c i a t i v e  ges tu re  o f  b e i n g  more 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and p r e c i s e  than Marcuse, b u t  b e i n g  s i m i l a r l y  s tuck  i n  a  
v iew t h a t  " i gno res  the meaning o f  a  democrat ic  s t a t e "  (A lexander ,  
1991:lSS). Alexander a l s o  argues t h a t  such a  p e r s p e c t i v e  emphasizes o n l y  
r ep ress ion ,  n o t  the r e s i s t a n c e  dominat ion meant f o r  Foucau l t .  T h i r d ,  he 
f a i l s  t o  ment ion  much l e s s  cons ider  the ma jo r  work which extends t h e  
post-modern p r o j e c t  i n  the  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e o r i z i n g  democracy, t h a t  o f  
Lac lau  and Mouf fe .  But why does he do t h i s ?  Alexander wants  t o  develop 
a  " r e a l i s t i c  t heo ry  o f  democrat ic  s o c i e t i e s "  (p .  1595, a  ca tegory  i n t o  
which post-modern views appa ren t l y  do n o t  f i t .  
Rather than "deepening" democracies, Alexander i s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  how 
they  a re  c o n s t i t u t e d  t o  s t a r t  w i t h .  Rather than c o n s t a n t l y  t r y i n g  t o  
f i n d  a  way t o  t u r n  a  f o rm  o f  subo rd ina t i on  i n t o  one o f  oppress ion,  
thereby  c r e a t i n g  ye t  another  s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t ,  Alexander c a l l s  f o r  the  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a  u n i v e r s a l i s m  ( i f  n o t  one based on Reason) t h a t  w i l l  
a1 low the democracy t h a t  Lac lau and Mouf fe  a re  so f ond  o f  deepening, .to 
s u r v i v e .  Tha t  u n i v e r s a l i s m  i s  t o  be found i n  the C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and thus,  
another  i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y  i s  e leva ted :  t h a t  o f  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  e x p e r t .  
W i th  A lexander 's  theory  o f  democracy i n  mode rn i t y ,  then, we have the  
problem f o r  i n t e 1 , l e c t u a l s  tu rned  on i t s  head, I n t e l l e c t u a l s  m igh t  be the  
most impor tan t  ac to r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  the l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  the good s o c i e t y .  
Tha t  proposed s o l u t i o n  i s  c e r t a i n l y  comfor t  i n g  t o  most East  Europeans, 
f o r  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  can p r o v i d e  some k i n d  o f  answer t o  how t o  l e g i s l a t e  the 
good s o c i e t y .  Here, p r e c i s e l y ,  i s  the problem, f o r  mode rn i t y  becomes the 
e x c l u s i v e l y  emancipatory v i s i o n .  
Mode rn i t y  acqu i res  even more purchase i n  post-communist s o c i e t i e s  
because o f  the  r e v i v a l  o f  pre-modern i n t e l l e c t u a l i t i e s .  I n  my i n t e r v i e w s  
o f  u n i v e r s i t y  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  i n  summer 1991, the o n l y  non-business 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  express ing  cons iderab le  con f idence  was the p r o r e c t o r  o f  the 
Cathol  i c  U n i v e r s i  t y  o f  t ub1  i n .  The end t o  communism, he be1 ieved, 
con f i rmed the v i s i o n  and s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  Poland o f  the Church. He 
was q u i t e  p roud  t h a t  a  number o f  " t h e i r "  p r o f e s s o r s  were i n  p o s i t i o n s  o f  
governmental a u t h o r i t y .  Indeed, w i t h  t h e i r  own graduates,  he f e l t  
c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  a  new more C a t h o l i c  Poland m igh t  be made. I n  h i s  sermon 
i n  h i s  summer 1991 Warsaw mass, Pope John Paul 11 r i d i c u l e d  the c l a i m s  of 
r e t u r n i n g  Poland t o  Europe, the popular  theme o f  modern i n t e l  l e c t u a l s .  
Rather ,  he s a i d ,  Poland has been a t  the h e a r t  o f  Europe f o r  over 1,000 
years,  communism no tw i t hs tand ing .  For Europe was based on C h r i s t i a n  
c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  and indeed, Western Europe m i g h t  i t s e l f  need t o  back o f f  
f r om i t s  own consumerism and m a t e r i a l i s m  t o  r e t u r n  t o  the s p i r i t u a l i t y  
t h a t  marked European c u l t u r e .  
Thus, the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o rder  Alexander f i n d s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  
democracy i s  l i k e l y  t o  be f i l l e d ,  i f  the C a t h o l i c  Church can r e a l i z e  i t s  
aims, w i t h  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  i t y  profound1 y  i n f i u e n c e d  by a  Cathol  i c  Church 
t h a t  f i n d s  n o t  o n l y  the a n t i - e s s e n t i a l i s t  c r i t i c a l i t y  o f  pos t -modern i t y  
b u t  a l s o  the pragmatism o f  modern i t y  inadequate grounds f o r  the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  a  moral s o c i e t y .  But t h i s  ve ry  c o n v i c t i o n  i s  o f  course 
the grounds f o r  the k i n d  o f  c o n f l i c t  Alexander sees as a n t i t h e t i c a l  t o  
democracy, where the h i g h e r  p r i n c i p l e s  t o  which one h o l d s  d e r i v e  n o t  f r om 
c i t i z e n s h i p ,  b u t  f rom a  "pre-g iven"  i d e n t i t y  i n  f a i t h .  
I f  the post-modern pe rspec t i ve  i s  t o  ge t  i n  on t he  a c t i o n  i n  Eas te rn  
Europe, i t  must somehow c o n f r o n t  bo th  pre-modern and modern 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i t i e s  and i n t e l l e c t u a l s  on a  t u r f  f rom which the post-modern 
cannot e a s i l y  be swept.  I b e l i e v e  one o f  the fundamental i ssues  f a c i n g  
postmodern s o c i a l  t heo ry  may be then t o  t h e o r i z e  an postmodern 
i n t e i l e c t u a l  p r a x i s  o f  a u t h o r i t y .  O r  i s  t h a t  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  terms? 
POST-MODERNITY AND EMANCIPATORY INTELLECTUAL PRAXIS 
,Post-modern i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y  does n o t  serve the c r i s i s  o f  p o s t -  
communism ve ry  w e l l  i n  the present  con junc tu re ,  f o r  seve ra l  reasons.  
1) The post-modern p e r s p e c t i v e  d im in i shes  the d i s t i n c t i o n  and 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  w h i l e  e l e v a t i n g  the importance o f  
know1 edgeab i 1  i t y  . 
T h i s  i s  a  h e a l t h y  move toward democracy w i t h i n  s o c i a l  movements! I 
would argue, as we no l onge r  have the convenient  sepa ra t i on  between 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  and l a b o r ,  o r  knm~ledge and power, t h a t  has animated 
s o c i a l i s t  and communist movements f o r  decades. New s o c i a l  movements are 
appea l ing  i n  the sense t h a t  they have e l e v a t e d  k n o w l e d g e a b i l i t y  i n t o  
i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y ,  and o b l i g e d  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  t o  be a c t i u i s t s .  One migh t  
argue t h a t  s o c i a l  movements and democracy a re  s t reng thened t oo  b y  t h i s  
broader d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y .  But u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  the pos t -  
modern c r i t i q u e  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  those i ' n t e l l e c t u a l s  a l r e a d y  sympathet ic  t o  
the l i b e r a l  and e g a l i t a r i a n  democrat ic p r o j e c t .  The modern i n t e l l e c t u a l  
e a s i l y  ignores  the post-modern c r i t i q u e  f o r  i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  o f f e r  a  
p o s i t i v e  t heo ry  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f o rma t i on .  
21 The post-modern p e r s p e c t i v e  can be embraced o n l y  by  those i n  the 
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  a u t h o r i t y ;  i n  f a c t  i t  ceases t o  be r e l e v a n t  when 
encountered by those i n  a u t h o r i t y .  
P r e c i s e l y  because i t  has no theory o f  i n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g ,  shunning the 
c o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  genera l  r u l e s  as b u t  one more i n h i b i t i o n  and r e p r e s s i o n  
o f  d i f f e r e n c e ,  the post-modern i n t e l l e c t u a l  r e t r e a t s  t o  a  s t a t u s  o f  
o p p o s i t i o n  and c r i t i q u e .  l dh i l e  t h i s  w i l l  mean imnocence f rom the  k i n d  o f  
f a u l t  many a  m a r x i s t  i n  power has s u f f e r e d ,  i t  a l s o  means an escape f rom 
the demands o f  the age, e s p e c i a l l y  when they f a l l  i n t o  one's l a p  as they 
have i n  Eas te rn  Europe. 
3) The post-modern p e r s p e c t i v e  i s  v i a b l e  and e f f e c t i v e  o n l y  w i t h i n  a  
democracy, e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  l e a s t  i n  rud imenta ry  form. I t  assumes the 
ex i s tence  o f  a  democracy t h a t  a l l o w s  the f l u i d i t y  o f  i d e n t i t y  f o r m a t i o n  
t o  f l o w  l e .g .  Lac lau  and Mouf fe ,  1985:154). 
I d e n t i t i e s  a re  a l s o  i n c r e d i b l y  uns tab le  i n  post-communist s o c i e t i e s ,  
b u t  i n  t h i s  sense, they  don't l ead  t o  a  deepening o f  democracy, b u t  t o  
the g r e a t e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e i t h e r  an uncooperat ive anarchy o r  p o l i t i c s  o f  
demogogery. Thus, most East  European i n t e l l e c t u a l s  w i l l  f i n d  l i t t l e  
c o n s o l a t i o n  i n  an approach t h a t  promises t o  exacerbate c o n f l i c t  and 
d e s t a b i l i z e  an a l r e d y  dangerous c o n d i t i o n .  But  i f  democrat ic  d iscourse  
is the precondition for the post-modern opening of society, and if 
intellectuals now have considerable authority in legislating new systems, 
what might the post-modern vision articulate for post-communist 
intellectuals in power? What kind of stabilization, what kind of 
restructuring of power, might faciliate the rise of the post-modern 
opposition in these srstems? I have been thinking about this for a 
while, now, and frankly I am perplexed. M y  thinking m o v e s  in two 
direct i ons, however. 
First, the post-modern hope for a wider dispersion of 
intellectuality through the broader recognition of the link between truth 
and power had especially fertile soil in Poland, or s o  I thought 
(Kennedy! 19901. T h e  civil society of Solidarity encouraged a wider 
range of people to consider how the break between power and knowledge w a s  
based. Now, however, the intellectuals that brought civil society t o  
Poland have sought to institutionalize, instead of the ideal public 
sphere which motivated them in 1980-81, the commodified public relations 
world in order to hide their own complicity in negotiating with an 
international system matters that should be the province of the local 
demos (that is if democracy m e a n s  self-rule). Kowal i k (19Pla) i l lustrates 
nicely just how important good relations with the IMF, perhaps more than 
with domestic society itself, have become for Poland's post-communist 
authorities. Returning t o  the ethos of the open public sphere motivating 
open negotiations between Solidarity and communist authorities in the 
Lenin Shipyards of 1980 might be a good alternative post-modern politics 
for those in authority. Whether that would be sufficiently "reasonable" 
for modern theorists of democracy like Alexander is another question, 
however. One w a y  in which is reasonableness would become apparent would 
be to consider how a media might be organized to facilitate open 
discussion and the discovery of subjugated discourses rather than 
motivate their repression and manipulation. But how? T o  where d o  w e  g o  
for answers t o  that? 
Second, the post-modern recognition of "blurring frontiers" a n d  
"ransfrurf~d demarcating lines" (iaclau and Mouffe, 1985:1711 might help 
to formulate a new intellectual politics of authority not only designed 
t o  combat neo-conservativism in government, and now neo-fascist 
tendencies in civil society, but also the sanctity of state borders 
themselves. 
One of the greatest opportunities for a post-modern political 
authority is in the making of the new Europe. With a new European 
Community in formation, the ideas of nations and citizens, the stable 
categories of modernity, are being transformed. A n d  now that inclusion 
in the Community itself is becoming increasingly a "political" issue, a 
new space for institution remaking is being opened up. Pre-modern or 
traditional intellectuals are likely to resist this, for fear of what it 
will d o  to the "natural" or "spiritual" nation. Modern intellectuals are 
likely to embrace it, but onlr for the formal economic ties it might 
bring. Post-modern intellectuals should see in the making of the 
Community the very foundations for a new politics of democracy, one that 
m a k e s  the idea of citizen and rights subject t o  deepening not only within 
nation-states, but across them from East t o  West. Post-modern 
intellectuality h a s  a great chance for not onlr the opposition in Europe, 
but a l s o  for intellectual authority in a post-communist Europe that seeks 
to redefine the continent's political and social boundaries, and the 
identities and alliances which might make for a more.democratic future. 
In these concluding remarks, however, the dependence of the post- 
modern vision on modernity becomes apparent. Not only is post-modernity 
dependent on the critique of modernity for its distinction, but it is 
also dependent on its institutions. T h e  open public sphere, the enlarged 
demos, are extensions of the Englightenment suggested by post-marxist 
intellectuals like Jurgen Habermas and David Held, intellectuals w h o  have 
taken the post-modern challenge seriously, but w h o  have retained 
modernity's concern for how intellectuals might theorize Reason in the 
institutions of society. Post-modernity needs this kind of modern 
intellectuality for its own relevance to be established: it needs the 
self-remedial institutions post-marxism claims to seek in order that the 
differences post-modernity aims to elevate can find a place in public 
life. At the same time, post-modernity also needs modern intellectuals 
of a critical persuasion; too easily can post-modernity be dismissed a s  
"unrealistic" or "insufficiently attentive to the distinction of 
democracy". One major challenge for intellectuality in the 21st century, 
I would propose, is to consider'and to help found the institutional 
.?" 
foundations that make post-modernity a counterculture that is more than 
the exclusive preserve of the autonomous, but politically irrelevant, 
.YE 
. .- intellectual. 
t- 
NOTES 
1. "there are few if any times and places in human history in which the 
educated and thinking crust of society w a s  seen -- by others a s  much a s  by 
themselves -- a s  a unified and compact group, which could compare with 
that of le philosophes in France in the third quarter of the eighteenth 
century" (p. 24). Bauman argues their significance w a s  great for six 
sociological reasons: 1) "absolutist monarchy w a s  about t o  reach its 
maturity"; 2) "a new concept of social control w a s  n e e d e d n ,  given the enw 
direct link between state and citizen; 3:) "the nobility lost its 
political significance well before a new social force, strong enough to 
claim the vacant political estate, appeared"! and ther w e r e  themselves 
being remade a s  academies in the sixteenth t o  seventeenth centuries 
provided them with the training that would given them their right to 
rule; 4) ther were "distinguished by the absence of a traditional status 
'or particualr function appropriate to them in the society", which 
distinguished France from those other European territories, like the 
Germanic lands whose university professors, state officials and clergymen 
fit the bill; 5 )  their autonomy w a s  reinforced by their own considerable 
integration through a "dense netowrk of communication"! providing a 
"horizontally structured" that could generate new foundations for 
certainty through its own production of consensus based o n  Reason that 
could challenge the certainty imbedded in faith in the Divine (p. 35); 
and $1 habits and old w a y s  of 1 ife were n o w  to be the object of 
legislation (pp. 24-26). Of course the foundation for t h i s  quarter of a 
century w a s  laid a s  early as the mid sixteenth century, a s  culture a s  
a v e r t u n  cam t o  mean more and more an achieved rather than ascribed trait 
(p. 31). 
2. T h e  CSST Power discussion group made a good point about Bauman's 
argument: h i s  argument about legislating modern intellectuals could be 
strengthened by refering not only to domestic absolutist European 
society, but also to the "civilizingn legislator in Europe's colonial 
intervent ions. 
3. For insta.nce his genealogical research contributes to counter 
hegemonic struggles b r  bringing out voices which have been silenced br 
global theories. Indeed, his focus on discourse and reverse discourse 
has been found quite useful in developing feminist practice, s o  argues 
Chris Weedon (1987:107-35). 
4. An especially fruitful comparison might be drawn with intellectuals 
in Poland, given that it is there where civil society in its broadest 
democratic form w a s  mobilized in 1980-81; elsewhere! mobilization has 
been resticted largely to the intelligentsia, or to a broader public but 
with much more limited duration and organizational effort. Nevertheless, 
the potential for relevance is still great in all of post-communism, 
given the prominence of an intelligentsia motivated by ideals, the only 
reward post-modernity potentially can offer. 
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